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George Graham, as many readers of Metapsychology would realise, has ranked 
amongst the foremost contributors to the philosophy of psychiatry and its cognate 
disciplines over the past two decades.  During this period and once more 
demonstrated by The Disordered Mind, he has developed a reputation for deftly 
dealing with the proliferation of the often abstract and abstruse arguments 
pervading the field.  Indeed, in this arena of enquiry where all too few facts are 
recruited to the service of all too many reified speculations in the popular media, 
Graham rarely shies from giving his readers a clear sense of how actual and 
hypothetical case-studies can illuminate the theoretical issues at stake.   
For all its praiseworthy features--including pertinent chapter summaries and 
bibliographical notes for those new to the field and those familiar with it--The 
Disordered Mind raises as many questions as it seemingly resolves.  This critique 
will particularly attend to two of its more contentious facets.  The first relates to the 
theoretical framing employed by Graham and the second to the explanatory force of 
that framing. 
The Disordered Mind as a whole uses two strategies.  First of all, it 
introduces its readers to some seemingly intractable philosophical problems about 
the nature of mind, especially in the first six chapters. It then pursues the apparent 
clinical consequences of a "realist" philosophy of mind Graham maintains, notably 
during the last three chapters.  By so apportioning his text, Graham invites readers 
to consider the nature of mental disorders principally from a philosophical point of 
view rather than approach mental disorder or illness from the perspective of 
psychopathology.  Notwithstanding an almost conversational tone at times, Graham 
confronts his readers--readers ranging from undergraduates to practitioners in the 
clinical sciences--with six theoretical questions which reverberate throughout the 
text.  What distinguishes mental from neurological disorders?  What part do social, 
psychological, and cultural factors play in a clinical understanding of mental 
disorders?  Are mental disorders diseases?  Is it possible to uphold a notion of 
mental disorder or illness without reducing or equating it to a physical or purely 
behavioural state?  Does mental disorder involve a dissolution of rationality?  Do 
stultifying facets of mental disorders also raise an ethical conundrum for issues of 
human dignity and self-respect? 
Graham's response to these six questions finds him upholding various forms 
of addiction, depression, delusion, obsession, and paranoia as exemplars of mental 
disorders (e.g. 40).   These disorders can be construed as mental in so far as they 
jointly possess mental symptoms and origins as distinct from physical or neural 
ones.  So, although paralysis agitans ("Parkinson's disease") is capable of including 
degenerative cognitive and emotional symptoms, it is not considered a mental 
disorder because it derives from impairment of the central nervous system (41, 104 
& 132).   Fundamentally what distinguishes the mental from the non-mental for 
Graham is "consciousness and intentionality" (30). Consciousness comprises the 
capacity to "harbor perspectives" or "possess the power or ability" to represent 
one's self or the world (30) and intentionality indicates that "our experiences and 
conscious representational states are about things, or directed at things, other than 
themselves" (31).  When mental capacities are severely disturbed as in cases of 
depression, the person affected enters "a self-stultifying impairment" to the point of 
becoming "incapable of rational self-scrutiny or taking proper responsibility for 
self," to the point also of losing "emotional connectivity with previously cherished 
goods" (46).  Hence, Graham ultimately contends that mental disorders preclude 
the exercise of "basic capacities or faculties of mind" which "when sufficiently 'well-
ordered' enable decent lives to be led" (139; cf. 145).  And "to achieve a satisfying 
or decent life" (150), there are "primary (basic, fundamental) psychological 
competencies that are bound to be required or desired" (147), including caring for 
others, comprehending communicative acts, engaging emotions, forming goals, 
identifying spatio-temporal contexts,  making choices and recognising alternatives 
(147-150).   
It is at this point that Graham has re-framed his conception of mental 
disorder or illness. In brief, what has begun as a tract embedding an understanding 
of psychopathology within a philosophy of mind has now embedded its philosophy 
of mind within moral philosophy, a moral philosophy given to the ends or purposes 
of human living in order to elucidate what is psychologically significant.   
However, this transformed theoretical framework operating in The 
Disordered Mind raises a number of reservations.  For example, are there not 
instances of harmful, non-voluntary ways of blocking the capacity for a decent life 
that do not qualify as mental disorders by Graham's definition?  Take the case of an 
Alyssa who is grossly inattentive or a Giorgio whose stuttering cannot conceal his 
illiteracy or an Alessio with facial deformities.  In what precise way or ways is the 
harm wrought by mental disorders to be distinguished from each of these 
instances, namely, being absent-minded, being illiterate, and being ugly?  Again, 
what if Giorgio, say, found that, to achieve a fulfilling life, it was far more 
efficacious for him neither to care for others nor to engage in emotional 
commitments?  In other words, has Graham ruled out of court and without 
discussion that a Giorgio's well-being might stem from acting upon the recognition 
of a socio-pathological alternative?  
In his quest to distinguish mental disorders from non-mental ones, Graham 
emphasizes that symptoms of the former are invariably "multiple" (54). Moreover, 
he asserts that, when taking into account "normal variations in human mental 
health and disorder," there "certainly seem to be no symptomatic hard edges or 
discrete boundaries" (54).  Consequently, he has little hesitation assigning a cluster 
of at least dozen criteria or symptoms to his exemplar of major or clinical 
depression, the "sheer multiplicity and contextual variability" of which bedevils 
attempts to diagnose it, let alone to discriminate it from, for example, "periods 
of...unhappiness or demoralization," "personality traits such as melancholia," or 
even "global attitudes like nihilism or pessimism" (54-55).   
One might interject here and ask by what means do we actually know if the 
nominated cluster of criteria apply to severe depression or not.  Presumably, if we 
do know, then it follows that we have a procedure for discriminating what cluster of 
criteria truly applies from what does not.  For example, Graham states that 
"obsession with objects...paucity of imaginative play, a lack of normally expressive 
social engagement..and...monotonous, repetitive activities" can be assigned to 
autistic symptoms (190), but not a cluster including, say, vertigo, temper tantrums, 
night terrors, and hyperaesthesia.  But, to adopt an argument first formulated by 
Roderick Chisholm in his 1982 paper, "The Problem of the Criterion," to know 
whether our procedure for so discriminating sets of criteria is a good one, we have 
to know whether it succeeds in distinguishing those that truly apply from those that 
do not and we cannot know that unless we already know which apply and which do 
not.  In short, is there a danger lurking behind Graham's account which ultimately 
locks us into logically circular explanations? 
At this juncture, Graham may attempt to counter such an objection by 
drawing upon the claim that, to talk about disorders in the mental realm, is to talk 
about episodes or events that "certainly appear to fail to emerge in a law-like 
fashion," let alone to emerge fully "from physical causal mechanisms" 
(58).  Furthermore, attributions of mental disorder presuppose "violations of norms 
or standards of prudential reasonableness or reason-responsiveness" (58).  In other 
words, the issue at stake is not simply knowing the sheer applicability or not of one 
cluster of criteria. The history of shifting taxonomies and criteria in the successive 
revisions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders would 
demonstrate the contestable nature of criteria or symptoms in the first place (see, 
e.g., 64-68, 102-105, 111-112 & 191-195).  Instead, what is at stake is the issue 
of what constitute the norms for mental disorder.  These norms, for Graham, are 
whenever intentionality is no longer coupled to rationality, or, to elaborate a little, 
whenever intentional content--and hence the objects of our cognitive processes and 
conscious representations--is divorced from "a rationally interconnected network of 
concepts" (120).   
When turning to his exemplar of addiction, Graham specifically focuses upon 
the behavioral pattern of relapsing after temporary cessation as a demonstration of 
the addict's inability to assume responsibility for him- or herself (160ff.).  By 
contrast, he claims, "Self-responsible people care about the future"; they have 
"long-term plans, projects or commitments to hold dear" (170).  For those addicts 
who may well care about the future, who have a variety of rational plans they 
cherish, and yet relapse without willingly doing so, has rationality simply 
disappeared as if its possession were an "all or nothing" matter?  Appeals to 
either/or arguments carry with them the risk of concluding that deficits are 
afoot.  Are we therefore any closer to an explanation of addiction when Graham, in 
his concluding summary of the seventh chapter, identifies it as "a deficit of rational 
resolve" (184)?  After all, why could such a deficit not be equally the hallmark of 
our absent-minded non-addictive Alyssa who is suddenly precipitated into a chronic 
state of indecision? 
Finally, there are some passing remarks on the autistic child which also call 
into question the explanatory force of Graham's theoretical approach. He suggests 
that, in the case of the autistic child, "Neural damage presumably is responsible for 
the incapacity to understand" (177).  Graham wonders whether its characteristic 
"repetitive, isolated play...reflects avoidance of situations that require 
understanding other persons" (177) whilst, at the same time, conceding that 
clinical investigation might be needed to establish if intentionality does or does not 
play "a proper part of a disorder's propensity conditions and if brute neural 
processes are the sole sources of a condition" (177).  Subsequently, Graham 
asserts that, although "the precise neurological details are not known," autism is "a 
neurodevelopmental disorder" whose "central symptom is...social aloneness" 
(190).  Yet, in any quest to understand autism empathetically, we are told  
Various symptoms may affect and be affected by others.  But focusing on 
symptoms does require not lumping...all sorts of symptomatic behaviors 
together.  Whether a symptom can be understood empathetically and apart 
from others is...an empirical question (191). 
On the basis of this empathetic approach and without challenging the belief in a 
"central" symptom, two questions come immediately to mind.  Firstly, is it possible, 
contrary to Graham's view, for the interaction of symptoms to have a cascading 
effect upon persons, to act as the cause of their disorder's prolongation or the 
origin of its severity?  Secondly, is the lack of a developmental focus in The 
Disordered Mind one reason why Graham never doubts that being bereft of "a 
rationally interconnected network of concepts" (120) is a defining feature of mental 
disorders?  And, to return to the autistic child, could the absence of such a 
conceptual network equally define any child before the age of conscious 
awareness?   
In conclusion, for all the potency and perspicacity of Graham's philosophical 
engagement with the nature of mental disorders, there still seems to be a place for 
disclosing the nature of mind from the perspective of psychopathology.  Perhaps an 
insufficient acknowledgement of that perspective by Graham might account for a 
noticeable omission.  Engaging the debates of a theoretically informed previous 
generation might have allowed Graham to interrogate the way, for example, a Kurt 
Goldstein amongst others assiduously plotted the terrifying psychological reversal 
of patients stripped of the basic capacity for abstract thought and speech and with 
it the most rudimentary understanding of self and world. 
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